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Abstract 
Mobile agent technology offers a dramatically evolving 
computing paradigm in which a program, in the form of a 
software agent, can suspend its execution on a host computer, 
transfers itself to another agent-enabled host on the network, 
and resumes execution on the new host. It is 1960's since mobile 
code has been used in the form of remote job entry systems. 
Today's mobile agents can be characterized in a number of ways 
ranging from simple distributed objects to highly organized 
intelligent softwares. As a result of this rapid evolvement of 
mobile agents, plenty of critical security issues has risen and 
plenty of work is being done to address these problems. The aim 
is to provide trusted mobile agent systems that can be easily 
deployed and widely adopted. In this paper, we provide an 
overview of the most recent threats facing the designers of 
agent platforms and the developers of agent-based applications. 
The paper also identifies security objectives, and measures for 
countering the identified threats and fulfilling those security 
objectives. 
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1. Introduction 
Software agents are a very promising evolving computing 
paradigm. However, there is no precise definition of a 
mobile agent till now. Some popular definitions of mobile 
agents are: "a persistent software entity dedicated for a 
special purpose" [1], " a software entity which tasks can be 
delegated" [2], and " computer programs that simulate a 
human relationship by doing something that another person 
could do for you" [3]. A comprehensive definition can be 
summarized as "Mobile Agent is  a program that can 
exercise an individual's or organization's authority, work 
autonomously toward a goal, and meet and interact with 
other agents".[4]. 
A mobile agent consists of three components namely code, 
state, and attributes. The code is the set of instructions that 
defines the agent's behavior. The state describes the agent's 
internal variables and enables it to resume its activities 
after moving to another host. Finally, attributes are 
information describing the agent, its owner, its movements, 
resource, and keys[ 5]. 
Mobile agents may interact among each other via a 
contract and service negotiation, auctioning, and bartering. 
They  may also be either stationary, always resident at a 
single platform; or mobile, capable of moving among 
different platforms at different times. [6] 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the characteristics of mobile agents. In section 3, 
we will discuss recent security threats on mobile agents. 
Section 4 will cover the countermeasures and security 
enhancements techniques  for security threats on mobile 
agents.  Conclusions and Future work will be summarized 
in Section 5. 
2. Mobile agent characteristics and system 
models 
Due to rapid growth and great advantages mobile agents 
bring to computing, plenty of work were done either on the 
mobile agent itself or on mobile agent systems holistically. 
Here we will provide the basic characteristics of a mobile 
agent as well as mobile system models as well. 
2.1 Mobile Agent Characteristics  
As described in Section 1, there is no precise definition of 
a mobile agent. However, every definition brings a group 
of characteristics of a mobile agent. A summary of these 
characteristics is provided below, these characteristics are 
extracted from [6], [7], [8], and [9] definitions of mobile 
agents.  
• Autonomist: the ability of the agent to execute 
without the need for human interaction. This 
feature does not prevent intermittent interaction 
which might be required from time to time. 
• Intelligence: the ability of the agent to learn, and 
adapt over time. Learning is crucial for intelligent 
mobile systems and enables them to adapt their 
behavior accordingly. 
• Communicative: an agent should have the ability 
to communicate with other agents for the purpose 
 of exchanging data. This communication should 
be regulated and monitored some how to prevent 
security breaches.  
• Goal Oriented: The mobile agent should have 
been oriented to a achieve a goal. This goal is 
explicitly stated in its internal plan of action. 
• Mobility: Mobile agent can decide to migrate to 
a different machine or network while maintaining 
their persistence (consistent internal state over 
time) 
• Perceiving:  A mobile agent should perceive its 
surrounding environment and react or response 
accordingly. Sometimes agents should not just 
react, they may take active steps to change that 
environment according to their own desire. 
2.2 Advantages of Mobile Agent Characteristics: 
Mobile agents are independent and can respond to changes 
in environment. This provides a strong basis to build up a 
reliable and robust system. Hence agents are used to ease 
user tasks and adapt to user requirements. However, this 
advantage of using mobile agents led to a very complex 
structure for mobile agent interactions. Besides, the 
dynamic nature of agents made it difficult to predict the 
agent behavior. This difficulty may lead to severe security 
problems that will be discussed in Section 3. 
2.3 Agent System Models: 
Agent systems can be categorized into four groups[10]: 
• Client Server Model (CS): The client 
component A requests the execution of a service 
with an interaction with the server component B. 
As a response, B performs the requested service 
by executing the corresponding know-how and 
accessing the involved resources collocated with 
B. 
• Remote Evaluation (REV): In REV paradigm, a 
component A has code to be executed but it lacks 
the resources required, which happen to be 
located at a remote site B. Consequently, A sends 
the code to B located at the remote site. B, in turn, 
executes the code using the resources available 
there and returns results to A. 
• Code On Demand (COD): In the COD 
paradigm, component A is already able to access 
the resources it needs. However, no information 
about how to manipulate such resources is 
available at A. Thus, A interacts with a component 
B at SB by requesting the code to be executed.  
• Mobile Agent (MA): The mobile agent paradigm 
is different from other mobile code paradigms 
since the associated interactions involve the 
mobility of an existing computational component. 
In other words, while in REV and COD the focus 
is on the transfer of code between components, in 
the mobile agent paradigm a whole computational 
component is moved to a remote site, along with 
its state, the code it needs, and some resources 
required to perform the task. 
In this paper, we will discuss security issues related to 
mobile agents, the mobile agent model consisting of a 
mobile agent and an agent platform is shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Fig. 1  Mobile agent model 
3. Mobile Agent Security Threats 
The dynamic nature of mobile agent led to complex design 
and security threats. These threats are categorized in four 
categories according to the originator of the threat and the 
victim. These categories are listed below: 
1. Agent to Platform: This category is related to 
threats of a mobile  agent to a particular platform. 
2. Platform to Agent: This category is related to 
threats of platform to a particular mobile  agent. 
3. Agent to Agent: This category is related to 
threats that may occur due to the interaction 
among mobile agents.  
4. Platform to Platform: This category addresses  
threats among  platforms of mobile agents. 
Researchers try to pin out each category and explain 
related threats. However, and because many threats span 
different categories, we will explain these threats 
independently and then show where they may occur. In 
Section 4, we will provide countermeasures against these 
threats. 
 3.1 Masquerading:  
A masquerade attack occurs when an illegitimate user tries 
to impersonate a legitimate user; therefore, the masquerade 
user gets the privileges from the legitimate user account. In 
mobile agent systems, this class of attacks may occur in the 
four above listed threat categories.  
In agent to platform and platform to agent threat categories, 
an unauthorized agent may claim the identity of another 
agent and hence gains access to services and resources to 
which it is not entitled.  The same way, an agent platform 
can masquerade as another platform and hence deceives 
the mobile agent to its true destination. This will enable the 
fake platform extract sensitive information from deceived 
agents[11], [12]. 
Agents can communicate with each other and hence a 
malicious  agent can deceive another agent and extract 
some sensitive information from it. The same can be done 
by platforms, a remote fake platform can deceive a 
legitimate one, and the latter may exchange information 
and forward agents to the faked platform[13], [14].  
3.2 Unauthorized Access: 
This type of attack is applicable for agent to agent and 
agent to platform, and platform to agent threat classes. By 
this attack a mobile agent can have access to a particular 
platform and hence affect other legitimate agents. Besides 
a mobile agent can directly interfere with another agent by 
invoking its public methods. It may even access and 
modify the agent's data or code.  This alternation may 
affect and change the legitimate agent's behavior (e.g., 
turning a trusted agent into a malicious one). [3] 
3.3 Denial of Service: 
Commonly, the term denial of service is used for attacks in 
which the focus is on exhausting resources with the effect 
that other entities cannot be served anymore. This 
definition works well for agent platforms. However, in 
mobile agent systems, this attack definition is extended to 
preventing  an agent from continuing to migrate to another 
host or may even delete the agent.[15]. this attack is 
applied to the platform to agent, agent to agent , and agent 
to platform threat classes. 
3.4 Repudiation: 
Repudiation attacks refer to denial of participation in the 
communication or transaction.  Repudiation can lead to 
serious disputes that may not be easily resolved unless 
proper counter measures are applied. In Section 4, we will 
report these countermeasures for such types of attacks. 
3.5 Alternation: 
Platform to agent threat class is subject to this type of 
attack. This attack implies the malicious alternation of the 
code or data of a mobile agent without being detected.  
Detection of malicious alternation is not that simple and 
does not have a general solution till now because the 
visiting agent platform have the right to access some of the 
code and data of a mobile agent and consequently it may 
alter them. 
3.6 Eavesdropping: 
Eavesdropping is a passive attack which involves the 
interception and monitoring of secret communications of a 
mobile agent. In mobile agents, eavesdropping is more 
sever because a platform can monitor every instruction 
executed by the agent. This forms a strong heuristic about 
the behavior of that agent. 
Table 1 below relates these attacks to threat classes. 
Table 1: summary of threat classes and corresponding attacks 
 
 Threat class 
Attack  1 2 3 4 
Masquerading Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Unauthorized 
Access 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Denial of Service Yes Yes No No 
Repudiation Yes Yes No No 
Alternation No Yes Yes No 
Eavesdropping No Yes  No No 
4. Mobile agent security countermeasures: 
In this Section, we will discuss security countermeasures 
required for mobile agent systems. First, we will describe 
the basic security requirements, and then we will list some 
dedicated security mechanisms used to secure mobile agent 
systems and detect or prevent some attacks.  
 4.1 Basic Security Requirements For M.A. Systems: 
In this subsection, we will provide the basic requirements 
for securing mobile agent systems, these include: 
authentication, confidentiality, availability, and 
accountability and non-repudiation. 
4.1.1 Authentication and Authorization: 
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of 
the entity. In mobile agent systems, authentication process 
requires both agent and platform to be authenticated by 
each other. i.e. the agent knows the executing environment 
and the executing environment knows the agent.  
Authorization is the process of deciding to grant a request 
or not after entity has been authenticated. To achieve those 
security properties, digital signatures and password 
protection are used together.  
4.1.2 Confidentiality, Privacy, and Anonymity: 
Confidentiality refers to the state of hiding sensitive data 
from being disclosed to un-authorized parties. The 
disclosure of such data may degrade the privacy level since 
data may have private information about agent. Revealing 
the behavior of a mobile agent may also degrade privacy to 
some extent. The privacy concerns may be treated by 
means of privacy preserving techniques such as enforcing 
an anonymity level which might reduce the threat [16]. 
Encryption also works well for hiding sensitive data from 
un-authorized parties but it may degrade performance[17]. 
4.1.3 Accountability and Non-repudiation: 
The problem of repudiation arise when a party claims 
being not involved in activity or a communication while it 
actually did. To overcome this problem, important 
communications and security related activities should be 
securely recorded for auditing and tracing purposes as well 
as for non-repudiation. These logs must be protected from 
un-authorized access to maintain the privacy and security 
levels of the system. 
4.1.4 Availability 
A mobile agent platform should ensure the availability of 
data and services required for local and incoming mobile 
agents. This implies that the platform should provide 
controlled concurrency, simultaneous access, deadlock 
management and exclusive access when required.[18]. 
Platforms should also be able to detect and recover from 
software crashes as well as hardware failures. It should 
also deal well and defend against denial of Service attacks.  
4.2 Security Threat Detection and Prevention 
Mechanisms in Mobile Agent Systems: 
In this sub-section, we will list some proposed mechanisms 
to detect or prevent an attack on mobile agent systems. 
These mechanisms are used to ensure that platforms will 
respect the policies of mobile agents they serve. 
4.2.1 Detection Techniques: 
Detection techniques are used to find out whether an agent 
has been changed or not. This includes tampering code, 
state, or execution flow. These techniques varies according 
to whether they work automatically or not, whether they 
work during execution or after termination, and whether 
they detect all possible alternations or some of them[19], 
[20]. 
Detection mechanisms also varies according to the scope 
of detection, some techniques use range checkers which 
detects illicit code manipulation according to variable 
values or timing constraints. Others use execution tracing 
and cryptography that allows them to detect attacks against 
code, state, and execution flow of mobile software 
components [21]. Hash function has been proposed as a 
detection mechanism for protecting the forward integrity 
results gathered by mobile programs [22], [23].   
4.2.1 Prevention Techniques: 
These mechanisms aim to leverage mobile agent security 
level against tampering attacks. Using these techniques 
will make it very difficult to illegally access or modify the 
code. Prevention techniques varies according to the goal of 
prevention which includes: preventing the entire agent or 
part of it, preventing attacks permanently or temporary, 
and trusting some functionalities or no trust is assumed 
[ 24].  
Some of these techniques relies on trusted environments 
equipped with tamper proof hardware computing base at 
each hosting platform [25]. However, the extension to a 
tamper proof hardware at each hosting platform limits the 
ability of a mobile agent to migrate at its will. [26] Used 
the concept of encrypted functions to prevent code 
tampering. Their approach encrypts both code and data 
 including state information in a way that enables direct 
computation on encrypted data without decryption. 
 In [17], the authors  have proposed The use of 
homomorphic encryption on a part of the data to be 
executed on the hosts without decrypting it. The main idea 
is to use a central host as a server which is responsible of 
encrypting and decrypting operations. Hasegawa et. al. 
proposed two secure mobile agent protocols with emphasis 
on efficient oblivious transfer suitable for secure function 
evaluation in un-trusted environments [27]. However, their 
model assumes that an agent can travel to one hop and then 
return back which limits the mobility property of agents. 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we provide a deep overview of the most 
recent threats facing the designers of agent platforms and 
the developers of agent-based applications. The paper 
identifies security objectives, threats, and countermeasures 
for these threats. Different security techniques for mobile 
agents were listed either for tamper detection or 
prevention. These techniques either inform the occurrence 
of attack or try to prevent it. Prevention is not always 
guaranteed and some extra effort should be done to 
enhance these techniques. 
Mobile agents has drawn much attention as a fundamental 
technology in next generation computing. However,  lots 
of security issues should be well addressed including: on-
running agent geo-localization, inter- mobile agent 
collaboration, real time attack detection, and mutual 
authentication between host ad mobile agent.  
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